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Introduction
Lethal autonomous weapon systems, or LAWS, are weapons that can select a target with the help of sensors
and artificial intelligence and attack with little to no human intervention [1]. There are several economic,
political, and social benefits to LAWS, but also there are risks and costs. Currently, there are no laws regulating
these weapon systems, but most stakeholders are lobbying for a change in policy. This policy brief discusses
three different potential states of policies: (1) no new policies to regulate LAWs, (2) a complete ban of LAWs,
and (3) strict regulations regarding the use of LAWs. We recommend allowing the deployment of LAWS with
strict regulations around their use and a mandated amount of human control.

The Grand Challenge
LAWS are weapons that require no human intervention to apply lethal force. This contrasts with humansupervised autonomous weapons, which allow for a human to remotely intervene in the
weapon’s operation at all times. The U.S. military is currently using unarmed
autonomous systems, such as the Squad Mission Support System (SMSS), a
vehicle designed to follow soldiers in the field while carrying supplies and
equipment [2]. The U.S. military has developed and tested armed
autonomous systems like the Have Raider, a “fully combat-capable
F-16” that can operate without human input [3]. However, no
LAWS are currently being used on the battlefield.

Current Policy
No international laws presently exist to regulate or
prohibit LAWS. The United States is not against the use of
LAWS but also does not currently own them. The U.S. might
be compelled to develop them if their adversaries do so [4].
Russia has taken a more aggressive approach, stating that
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research on LAWS is a top defense priority, for
the advancement of science. On the other hand,
172 countries and organizations have come
together to form The Campaign to Stop Killer
Robots promoting a complete ban of “killer
robots” [5].

Risks, Benefits and Ethics
LAWS, in the best case, can win wars
efficiently. However, the lack of human
intervention can lead to an unwanted loss of
civilian life [6]. The increasing complexity of
LAWS makes it difficult to test these weapons in
challenging scenarios. The risk of LAWS suffering
bugs, system failures or getting hacked also
increases this level of unpredictability, leading to
more risk in their deployment.
However, advancements in LAWS technology
demonstrate that such systems can be much
more precise and effective than humans. These
systems can be designed to only fire once fired
upon, helping reduce the risk of civilian
casualties. LAWS also decrease financial costs of
maintaining, training, or treating military
personnel, allowing for a much cheaper
alternative to soldiers. This approach leads to a
reduction of the number of service members
lost, making LAWS a viable, life-saving
technology [7].
Even if LAWS can differentiate between
targets, there still exists a significant ethical
concern regarding the actual use of these
systems. Even if LAWS are designed to follow a
proper ethical code, such as properly
distinguishing
between
civilians
and
combatants, the possibility for them being used
improperly or unethically will continue to exist
[8]. It is argued that the removal or partial
removal of human decision making would lead to
a “loss of dignity” for their human targets. In

turn, this creates severe human rights concerns
and unnecessary fear within civilian societies as
there would no longer be humans making the
decision to kill [9]. It is then argued that the best
way to preserve humanity’s dignity would be to
control the algorithms designed for LAWS to
retain a human-in-the-chain to preserve this
accountability and avoid any moral wrongdoing
[10].

Costs
The use and deployment of LAWS would
inquire many economic, societal, psychological,
and political costs. For economic costs, “global
research spending on autonomous weapons and
AI [artificial intelligence] is projected to reach
$16 and $18 billion U.S. dollars respectively by
the year 2025” [11], and autonomous weapons
would need to be heavily regulated by an
international body like the United Nations
Security Council (UNSC), further adding to LAWS’
monetary cost. Societal costs of LAWS would
include the loss of “human dignity” and
dehumanization of warfare caused by relegating
the decision to kill a human being to a robot,
causing a loss of responsibility and moral
accountability for lives lost [12]. Autonomous
weapons, as seen by existing research on the
psychological effects of drones, could also create
a large psychological toll for civilians anticipating
an attack. Finally, according to a survey done by
Ipsos, sixty-one percent (61%) of people are
completely opposed to autonomous weapons
[13]. This opposition, in addition to the thirty
(30) countries that oppose the use of
autonomous weapons [14], suggests that
developing LAWS could harm domestic political
careers and foreign diplomatic relations of policy
makers that support LAWS.
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Policy Alternatives and
Recommendations
One option is to allow LAWS to exist under
current laws of warfare. This would allow
militaries to reap the full benefits of deploying
autonomous weapons. LAWS could be designed
to avoid ethical issues by being designed to only
fire when fired upon, and to only be deployed
where civilian casualties are unlikely (such as
underwater or in space) [7]. Accountability for
mishaps would fall on those who chose to deploy
the weapons while knowing (or while they
should have known) their risks. However, this
would not prevent states or non-state actors
from designing or deploying LAWS unethically
and would make it difficult to restrict unethical
use of these weapons.
There is also the option to completely prohibit
autonomous weapons altogether, eliminating
any risks that come with their use. Prohibition of
autonomous weapons would also quell any
ethical concerns around their use in warfare.
However, the complete prohibition of
autonomous weapons would have a large
legislative toll, and it would take a large effort on
both a national and global level to put
prohibitions and treaties in place around the
world. Along with this, any existing development
and research on autonomous weapons would
either need to be retooled or scrapped, creating
additional monetary costs.
Finding a balance in terms of the regulation of
LAWS will allow for the best combination of
military benefits and ensuring the technology is
used ethically. Compliance with International
Humanitarian Law should be the basis of
creating such policy regulations, and respect for
human dignity can be preserved by retaining
human control [15]. Policies that permit human
operators to intervene in LAWS will allow for

increased
transparency
in
terms
of
accountability when a user or party needs to be
identified. This brief recommends this balanced
approach,
proposing that
international
regulation requiring human supervision for
autonomous weapons be created and enforced.
Without any major agreements, it will be
difficult to ensure the risks and dangers of
autonomous weapons are mitigated. There are
several directions the policies can go. The first
option would be to let the current state of policy
remain and trust the developers of LAWS to use
them ethically. Another option would be to
completely ban their development and
deployment. The final option, that we
recommend, would be to enforce strict
regulations on the use of LAWS to prevent
unethical use and also to prevent the toll of
enforcing a complete ban.
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